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THE COASTAL AREA MANAGEMENT ACT IN THE
COURTS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
PETER

I.

G. GLENNt

INTRODUCTION

Elsewhere Professor Thomas Schoenbaum has expressed a somewhat optimistic appraisal of the Coastal Area Management Act of 1974.1
In his view the Act will result in reasonably effective and environmentally sensitive regulation of land and water uses in the twenty coastal
area counties. 2 Early in 1974 few persons believed that legislation such as this would emerge from the North Carolina General
Assembly. Professor Milton Heath's description of the legislative history of the Act indicates the nature of the political difficulties which attended its birth.3 It is the thesis of this article that, before Professor
Schoenbaum's optimism can be confirmed, some of the policy battles
described by Professor Heath will be fought again, but this time in
the courts rather than in the General Assembly. Because of the economic stakes involved in the regulation of land and water uses in the
coastal area, it is likely that the validity of the Act will be tested in the
courts by potential land developers.
The Act creates a mechanism for coordinated state and local regulation of land and water areas of the coastal area which have been
denominated by the Coastal Resources Commission as "areas of environmental concern," and requires the formulation of general land use
plans for each of the twenty coastal counties.4 However, aside from the
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. I have been fortunate to have the excellent assistance of Mr. William Patrick McKeithan, a third year
student at the University of North Carolina School of Law, in the preparation of this
article.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-100 to -128 (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
2. Schoenbaum, The Management of Land and Water Uses in the Coastal Zone:
A New Law is Enacted in North Carolina,53 N.C.L. Rnv. 275 (1974).
3. Heath, The Legislative History of the Coastal Area Management Act, 53
N.C.L. REV. 345 (1974).
4. For a description of the process of designating "areas of environmental concern" see Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 285-86.
State and local cooperation is one of the key features of the Act. Indeed, it is arguable that a desire to provide for substantial local government participation in coastal
area management is one of the few legislative policy choices which is clear on the face
of the Act. Essentially, the State government, acting through the Coastal Resources
Commission, designate$ the "areas of gnvir9 nqient1 colacem" .nd adopts "guidelin "
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broadly expressed policy goals stated in section 113A-102,r the more

explicitly defined exceptions to regulation expressed in section 113A103(5)(b) 6 and standards limiting the designation of "areas of environmental concern" set forth in section 113A-113, 7 the Act is virtually
free of legislative direction on the substance of regulatory policy.
For the purposes of this article, the significance of the Act's lack
of substantive content is that it is difficult to describe potential litigation issues except in broad terms. Lawsuits dealing with 'the application of the Act to particular land probably will focus on questions of
fact bearing on the ultimate issue of the reasonableness of the regula-

tion or order being contested.

At this point one can only speculate

for the coastal area and for the county land use plans. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-106
to -107 (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3). Local governments are
given the responsibility for adopting county land use plans and are entitled to serve as
limited permit-letting agencies.
The General Assembly's decision to create a management system involving substantial local government participation is significant from three perspectives. First, it seems
clear that this feature of the Act was essential to its passage. See Heath, supra note
3, at 362-66. Secondly, it can be argued that the necessity for the Act was created in
part by the failure of local governments in eastern North Carolina to utilize the planning,
zoning and subdivision regulation powers previously granted to them by the General As.
sembly. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-360 to -455 (1972), as amended, (Supp.
1974). Thus it is arguable that the most important feature of the Act is not that the
General Assembly has taken a single-mindedly preservationist position with respect to
the coastal region, but that it has created a system in which planning and some regulation are certain to be accomplished. Thirdly, utilization of the local governments as
agencies for the accomplishment of some of the purposes of the Act has a beating on
the reasonableness of the western boundary of the coastal area as defined by the Act.
See text accompanying notes 44-45 infra.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-102(b) (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet
no. 3), establishes four basic goals which can be summarized by stating that the Act
is designed to create a system for rational decision-making which considers environmental as well as economic and social factors. However, despite statutory references
to "ecological considerations," "preservation" and "esthetic values," it is not clear that
in this section the General Assembly has stated that preservation or environmental protection is to be a preferred policy. This same section makes references to "economic
values," "capability for development," "economic development" and "transportation patterns."
6. Nine exceptions to the general definition of "development" are set forth in section 113A-103(5) (b). See Heath, supra note 3 at 384-93 for a discussion of the legislative history of these provisions. Road and highway maintenance, railroad and utility
maintenance, construction of certain utility installations, agricultural and forestry activities except where excavation or filling is involved, "emergency" maintenance, construction of "accessory" buildings and activities for which certain commitments were made
prior to passage of the Act are excepted. Moreover, the Commission is instructed to
adopt rules defining "minor maintenance and improvements" which are to be exempt
from the permit requirements of the Act.
7. Section 113A-113 requires that the Coastal Resources Commission designate
"areas of environmental concern" from within seven designated categories of land and
water. The Act contains no other substantive guidance for the Commission to assist
it in designating such areas.
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about the nature of the details of the actual implementation of the
Act. However, these limitations do not preclude an examination of
some of the ways in which the Act might be attacked on its face.
The Act applies to only twenty North Carolina counties." Within
that area it requires the preparation of county land use plans and mandates a permit-letting process for certain development on land and
water areas designed as "areas of environmental concern." 9 The
permit-letting process might result in denials of permission for intensive or highly remunerative development. Such permit denials are
likely to result in claims that the underlying regulation as applied to
the land involved constitutes an unconstitutional "taking" of property
rather than a reasonable exercise of the police power. If successful,
such "takings" claims may trigger an exercise of eminent domain by
the Department of Administration. 0
Coastal area landowners affected by this process might question
the fairness of the Act. For example, coastal area development projects will be treated differently than similar projects elsewhere in the
State. A state agency may deny a coastal area developer permission to
build a condominium while similar projects are constructed under local regulations in a Piedmont county and are permitted without the
necessity for public permission in a scenic mountain valley in a western county. By what standards are sections of the coastal area selected for regulation and on what basis is development permission denied? And, when permission to develop is denied in the coastal area,
landowners possibly will feel that they are being asked to devote their
land to public use by retaining it in its natural state. This certainly
appears to be "confiscatory," but, if such a constitutional claim is
successfully presented to a court, the Act permits condemnation of the
property interest.
Attorneys for coastal area landowners probably will consider attacking the Act on a number of grounds. Some such attacks could invalidate the Aot or substantially weaken it. It is the purpose of this
article to sketch the dimensions of some legal arguments which are
likely to be made in connection with four such attacks on the Act.
First, does the Act violate the State constitutional prohibition against
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-103(2)-(3) (1974 Advance Legislative Service,
pamphlet no. 3). See Heath, supra note 3, at 368-71.
9. N.C. GmN. STAT. §§ 113A-110, 116-128 (1974 Advance Legislative Service,
pamphlet no. 3).
10. Id. § 113A-123(c).
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local legislation? Second, is the Act invalid because it delegates power
to ,the Coastal Resources Commission without sufficient standards,
thus violating -the constitutional prohibition against delegation of legislative power to non-legislative bodies? Third, does the Act's definition of an invalid taking through regulation adequately protect landowners from unconstitutional regulation while leaving the Commission
free to carry out an effective program of regulation? Fourth, is the
Act's provision for acquisition of property interests in the event of a
taking by regulation consistent with the requirement that compulsory
acquisitions of property be for a public use?1 1
I.

Is T-m ACT INVALID LOCAL LEGISLATION?

Article El, section 24(1) of the North Carolina constitution forbids the General Assembly from enacting any "local, private or special
act . . . (a) relating to health, sanitation and the abatement of nuisances . . . (e) relating to non-navigable streams . . . (j) regulating
labor, trade, mining or manufacturing." Article XIV, section 3 of
the constitution defines "general laws" as those "enacted for classes
defined by population or other criteria."
If the Act is characterized as falling into one of the categories
enumerated in Article II, section 24(1), it is valid only if it is a general law. The Act establishes a class: the twenty counties designated
by the Governor as lying within the "coastal area" as defined by the
Act. 2 This class is defined by criteria other than population. The
validity of the classification will depend upon whether the class is held
to be rationally related to the purpose of the Act. 13
A textual analysis of the Act indicates that it relates to or regulates
matters for which the constitution mandates a general law. To the
extent that the Act is intended to minimize water pollution"' it seems
to relate to "health and sanitation" and to the "abatement of nuisances."'15 The regulation of coastal waters and estuaries by the
11. This list of issues is not intended to be exhaustive. The purpose of this article
is to engage in a preliminary examination of those issues that, if resolved adversely to
the State, might render the Act totally invalid or ineffective.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-103(2)-(3) (1974 Advance Legislative Service,
pamphlet no. 3).
13. See text accompanying notes 43-45 infra.
14. See N.C. Gm. STAT. § 113A-102(b) (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
15. This depends on whether the word "abatement" can be construed to include
prevention of nuisances,
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Coastal Resources Commission pursuant to the Act' 6 certainly includes
regulation of "non-navigable streams." Also, the expressed goal of
the Act to coordinate "economic development. . . including. . . construction, creation and design of industries, port facilities, commercial
establishments and other developments"' 7 with other demands on the
land and water resources presupposes regulation of "trade, mining or
manufacturing." However, textual analysis must be coupled with an
understanding of the meaning imported to section 24 by the courts
before a firm conclusion can be reached. This caution is dictated
by the fact that the Act can be characterized as legislation only indirectly dealing with the matters enumerated in section 24(1): its direct
effect is simply to establish a system of government decisionmaking.
Moreover the Act is potentially applicable to substantive matters beyond those listed in section 24(1).
In 1967 Professor Joseph S. Ferrell published -the definitive article on the local legislation prohibition in North Carolina.' 8 His analysis of the cases decided to that date persuaded him that the North
Carolina Supreme Court's decisions "contain no guidance for determining what is not a regulation of trade or health or an abatement
of a nuisance. Neither ha[s] the court . . . articulated policies sufficient for analysis to determine what objectives of government must
be implemented uniformly throughout the territorial extent of the
state." I9 Professor Ferrell noted that the meaning of the constitutional
language "relating to non-navigable streams" had not been liti20
gated.
The post-1967 cases offer no additional guidance on the scope
of the "health" or "non-navigable streams" clauses, 2 ' and the mean16. N.C. GnEN. STAT. § 113A-102(b) (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet

no. 3).
17. Id. § 113A-102. The Act defines development to include "removal of minerals." Id. § 113A-103(5) (a).
18. Ferrell, Local Legislation in the North Carolina General Assembly, 45 N.C.L.
REV. 340 (1967).
19. Id. at 401.
20. Id. at 400.
21. Most of the post-1967 article II, section 24 cases deal with the "trade" provision. See Smith v. County of Mecklenburg, 280 N.C. 497, 187 S.E.2d 67 (1972); Whitney Stores, Inc. v. Clark, 277 N.C. 322, 177 S.E.2d 418 (1970); Gardner v. City of
Reidsville, 269 N.C. 581, 153 S.E.2d 139 (1967); Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Henderson,
17 N.C. App. 335, 194 S.E.2d 213 (1973). In Gaskill v. Costlow, 270 N.C. 686, 155
S.E.2d 148 (1967), the court held that an act of the 1963 General Assembly applicable
only to the Town of Beaufort which established an exception for Beaufort in connection
with obligations to provide sewage service to newly annexed territory was a local act
relating to health and sanitation. This holding was consistent with earlier cases holding

that sewer-system matters related to "health."
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ing of the trade clause has been articulated with only slightly more specificity. The leading case on the scope of the trade clause is Smith v.
County of Mecklenburg2 which dealt with the constitutionality of a
statute authorizing an election to determine whether the sale of liquorby-the-drink would be allowed in Mecklenburg County.
In Smith, a unanimous court held the enabling statute invalid
as a local act relating to trade. The court quoted from its opinion in
High Point Surplus Co. v. Pleasants,23 in which it said, "Trade within
the meaning of Article HI, Section 29 of our Constitution is a business
venture for profit and includes any employment or business embarked
in for gain or profit."' Smith concluded that "any restauranteur who
elected to purchase, sell and serve alcoholic beverages in the manner
prescribed by the Mecklenburg Act would be embarking upon a business venture for gain or profit."25
Interestingly,'like the Coastal Area Act, the Mecklenburg liquor
referendum statute did not directly regulate any business activity. The
Mecklenburg statute provided for the adoption of a "comprehensive
plan for the administration, sale and enforcement of mixed beverages
by the drink in the County."20 The statute then provided for an election to determine whether the comprehensive plan would become effective. However, the court chose to characterize the Mecklenburg Act
as one regulating trade. 7 This approach is consistent with the inference that the General Assembly intended to permit by-the-drink liquor
sales if the voters approved.
It is less certain that the General Assembly which enacted the
Coastal Area Act had a clear intention that any ventures for profit are
to be affected in any particular way by operation of the Act. The
potential impact of the Act is quite broad; it might result in denial
of a permit to a landowner to build a residence for himself-not trade
according to the court's definition-or it might result in the denial of a
permit to construct a motel-certainly trade within the definition.
This breadth of potential application suggests an analogy to
State v. Chestnutt.28 Chestnutt involved a statute which made it unlawful "for any person, firm, or corporation to engage in, promote,
22. 280 N.C. 497, 187 S.E.2d 67 (1972).
23. 264 N.C. 650, 142 S.E.2d 697 (1965).
24. Id. at 655-56, 142 S.E.2d at 702.

25. 280 N.C. at 509, 187 S.E.2d at 75.
26. Id. at 499, 187 S.E.2d at 69.
27. Id. at 506, 187 S.E.2d at 73.

28. 241 N.C. 401, 85 S.E.2d 297 (1955).
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or in anywise participate in any motorcycle or other motor vehicle race
or races on Sunday in Wake County, North Carolina. ' 29 The statute
was not addressed directly, solely or specifically to commercial racing,
but rather comprehended both commercial and non-commercial activity. The court held that this statute did not fall within the trade category. In the later case of Orange Speedway, Inc. v. Clayton"0 the
Chestnutt case was distinguished. The statute involved in Clayton
required the promoters of motor vehicle races for profit to purchase
insurance and was thus viewed by the court as directly relating to
trade.
Chestnutt's apparent holding, that an act does not regulate trade
if it is broad enough to encompass both commercial and non-commercial activity, might comfort supporters of the Coastal Area Act were it
not for the fact that in Smith the court appeared to be slightly uncomfortable with Chestnutt. In Smith Chief Justice Bobbitt was very
careful to point out that the defendants in Chestnutt appealed "solely
... 1 This
on the ground that the act regulated labor and trade.
emphasis engenders speculation that, if the court had been asked to
characterize the statute at issue in Chestnutt as one relating to health
or the abatement of nuisances, it might have done so.
So too with the Coastal Area Act. If the Act is held not to regulate trade or mining on the grounds that the statutory definition of development comprehends more than mining or profit-motivated activity, opponents will certainly charge that it relates to the abatement of
nuisances or to sanitation. There is little helpful case law. Although
the Coastal Act is not a local zoning act, it deals with the same general
problem-governmental regulation of land uses. The supreme court
has twice refused to consider whether local acts granting special zoning powers are unconstitutional.32 However in Chadwick v. Salter,33
described by Professor Ferrell as "the most peculiar" local legislation
case, 34 the court invalidated an act directing the sheriff of Carteret
County to remove and sell livestock running at large on Shackleford
Banks in violation of the 1957 Sand Dune Protection Act. The
29. Id. at 402, 85 S.E.2d at 298.
30. 247 N.C. 528, 101 S.E.2d 406 (1958).
31. 280 N.C. at 510, 187 S.E.2d at 76 (emphasis by the court).
32. Fox v. Board of Comm'rs, 244 N.C. 497, 94 S.E.2d 482 (1956); Vance S. Harrington & Co. v. Renner, 236 N.C. 321, 72 S.E.2d 838 (1952).
33. 254 N.C. 389, 119 S.E.2d 158 (1961).
34. Ferrell, supranote 18, at 398.
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court characterized the Carteret County livestock act as relating to the
abatement of a nuisance and thus invalid.
It seems most likely that the Coastal Area Act will be held to be
the type of statute required to be a general law. It definitely, although indirectly, relates to non-navigable streams. If Chestnutt can
be avoided, the Act possibly will be held to regulate trade as well since
Smith suggests that a statute creating a decision-making process which
in turn will affect commercial activity will be characterized as regulating trade. Finally, although Chadwick's precedential value is minimal, it suggests that legislation for the protection of dunes may be
characterized as relating to the abatement of a nuisance; it is difficult
to imagine why the word "abatement" in the constitutional text should
not be construed broadly to encompass preventive as well as post facto
regulation.
A holding that the Coastal Area Act falls into one of the categories required to be treated by general law would be very satisfying if
either (1) the major policy underlying article II, section 24 were to
promote rational legislative consideration of certain questions by requiring action only when most or all members of the General Assembly
are forced to consider the interests of their own constituents, or (2) the
policy were to promote equality of treatment without regard to irrelevant territorial differences. Professor Ferrell's analysis of the history
of the local legislation prohibition, however, convinced him that these
were not the major concerns underlying the constitutional provision."0
Rather, he concluded that the major impetus for the prohibition was
a'desire to improve the legislative process by freeing the legislators
from the burden of considering hundreds of bills relating to minor matters of purely local concern."0 In short, the major policy consideration was that of promoting legislative housekeeping. Indeed, Professor Ferrell states: "In view of the legislative history [of the provision], it is ironic that it has come to regulate not the trivial and inconsequential, but acts having some significance from both state and
37
local points of view."
It is arguable that, despite the teachings of legislative history,
the supreme court regards the provision as relating to the validity of
statutes of "some significance" which involve territorial differentiations. If, as Smith indicates, the ultimate constitutional determina35. See id. at 342-60.
36. Id. at 358.
37. Id. at 400-01.
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tion involves an analysis of the rationality of a territorial classification based on population or other criteria, it would seem that the current policy basis for the restriction relates to more than the prevention
of legislative trivia; the major policy may be to require legislative
rationality at least to the extent that geographic areas of the state are
treated similarly unless relevant differences in geography, economics
or population permit a reasonable differentiation. The ultimate goal
might be to encourage legislative thoughtfulness and responsibility. If
this is perceived by the court to be an objective of the constitutional
provision, it would not be surprising if the court broadly defined the
matters enumerated in section 24(1) in order to bring more cases
within the ambit of the provision, thus providing opportunities to focus attention on the more important question of whether a classification involving less than the entire territory of the state is reasonably
related to the legislative purpose.
This conclusion would suggest that matters of land use regulation
should be treated as enactments relating to health, sanitation, the
abatement of nuisances, and trade. There seems to be little reason
why, in the abstract, there should be any significant differential in
the powers or procedures of governments regulating land use activities in various parts of the State unless the General Assembly finds that
there are substantial differences in geography, or economic or social
conditions which are relevant to the differences in powers or procedures. 88 If this reasoning is even implicitly recognized by the court,
it seems likely that the critical question with respect to the Act will not
be whether it can be characterized as relating to one or more of the
categories enumerated in article II, section 24 but whether the twenty
county classification is reasonable.
That the characterization issue is subordinate to the classification
question is suggested by the structure of the court's opinion in Smith.
In that opinion the court first discussed the classification test. It relied on McIntyre v. Clarkson0 as the genesis of the rational classification test in North Carolina. This test, long applied in other jurisdictions, was stated by the court in Smith as follows: "[a local act is]
an act applying to fewer than all counties, in which -the affected coun38. But see City of Durham v. Manson, 21 N.C. App. 161, 204 S.E.2d 41 (1974),
which held that a local act giving the City of Durham "quick take" condemnation power
was not violative of article II, section 24: "It is our view that no part of Section 24
prohibits the enactment of local legislation of the character such as that which is now
before us." Id. at 168, 204 S.E.2d at 45.
39. 254 N.C. 510, 119 S.E.2d 888 (1961).
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ties do not rationally differ from the excepted counties in relation to
the purpose of the act."' 40 As the test is stated, the crucial litigation
question is that of defining the purpose of the legislation. If the purpose of the Coastal Area Act is perceived to be the protection of the
unique ecosystems of the coastal zone, a classification based solely on
relevant ecological considerations seems rationally related to the purpose. If, on the other hand, the purpose of the Act is perceived to be
the creation of a new relationship between state and local governments with respect to land use regulation, then it is difficult to see how
a classification limited to twenty eastern counties is rationally related
to its goal. Such a classification would appear to be quite underinclusive.
Supporters of -the Act might argue that the purpose of the Act is
a combination of the two goals stated above. That is, the purpose is
rational management of the unique coastal area through state and
local government cooperation. The fact that the coastal zone is a
unique and exceptionally fragile ecosystem has been recognized not
only in North Carolina but throughout the nation.4 ' Traditionally,
regulation of land uses has been, a function of local government.
Thus the purpose can easily be seen as accomplishing the recently
articulated goal of protecting the coastal ecosystem -through a process which recognizes the traditional role of local government.42
Throughout the legislative process, concern was expressed about
the difficulty of developing rational criteria to define the western boundary of the coastal area.43 Of the several alternatives considered, most
involved drawing a western boundary line consistent with ecological
or geographic determinants. Such an exercise proved to be unworkable because of 'the difficulty of locating the boundary and because of
conflicting scientific opinions on the merits of one location over another. Likewise, the selection of counties on the basis of a totally unscientific (and probably totally political) judgment would have been
unsatisfactory. Instead, the General Assembly fixed the western boundary of the coastal area by reference to two factors, each of which is
40. 280 N.C. 497, 507, 87 S.E.2d 67, 73 (1972).
41. Congress has encouraged state management programs for these areas. See
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. II, 1972).
42. In fact, the federal coastal area legislation requires that local government
boundaries be used in defining the coastal area. See Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 283.
In North Carolina land use regulation has traditionally been a local responsibility. See,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-360 to -455 (1972).
43. See Heath, supranote 3, at -.
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relevant to its purpose. First, county lines, easily recognized and encompassing the territory (and thus the constituency) of the local government units responsible for much of the management program, serve
as .the western boundary. But these county lines are fixed by reference to criteria related to the environmental protection aspects of the
Act. The crucial ecological concerns here are those relating to the
fragile estuarine system in which fresh and salt water mix. The Act defines the coastal sounds as the limits of seawater encroachment on certain tributary rivers under normal conditions. For ease of location
those limits of encroachment were defined in the Act by reference to
nearby points of confluence of the river and some other stream. With
the exception of counties lying entirely west of the points of confluence, any counties adjoining, adjacent to, intersected by or bounded by
the Atlantic Ocean or a coastal sound as so defined were to be designated as coastal area counties.4" This compromise, adopted after extensive legislative consideration, appears to be based on criteria which
the General Assembly might reasonably have found to be related to the
purpose of the Act. This is all the State constitution requires.
As Professor Heath has indicated, the Act underwent extensive and
searching consideration in the General Assembly.
It is a carefully
considered statute designed to accomplish an important state purpose
through cooperation between the state government and the local governments whose territory encompasses unique, valuable and fragile resources. As such, it should be held valid under the local legislation
provision.
Assuming that the Act passes muster under article II, section 24,
will it necessarily be held valid under the equal protection clause of
the United States Constitution or the "law of the land" clause of the
State constitution insofar as it distinguishes between landowners in ,the
twenty coastal area counties and landowners in the eighty other counties of the state? There is no doubt that owners of land in areas of
environmental concern will be treated differently than other landowners. Because their land has been determined, through a rule-making
procedure, to be especially ecologically important or sensitive, they
will be required to secure permits from a State agency before undertaking development.
Generally, the federal courts have not applied the equal protec44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-103(3)

(1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet

no. 3).
45. See generally, Heath, supra note 3.
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tion clause to territorial classifications.4" The equal protection clause
protects persons rather than places. This is not an entirely satisfying
answer; the Act has the effect of treating people differently because of

the locus of their property. However, in this sense the Act is not uncommon; state delegations of power to local governments often result
in such different treatment.
Assuming, arguendo, that the federal courts would examine the
territorial classification of the Act from the perspective of the equal pro-

tection clause, it seems most likely that the so-called "minimal scrutiny" or "rational basis" test would be applied. It is clear that the
classification established by the Act is not "suspect. '47 Moreover, it is
unlikely that any interest impinged here could be characterized as "fun-

damental": 48 the effect of the Act on people is to require that their
development plans be tested against police power regulations.

Land-

owners in the coastal zone counties theoretically have been susceptible
4
to similar regulations for years. 1
Application of the "rational basis test" in effect requires a federal
court to undertake an analysis very similiar to that suggested in examining the validity of the Act under the local legislation prohibition of
the State constitution. The result should be the same: the territorial

classification is rationally based on the purposes of the legislation. 0
III. DoEs THE ACT INVALIDLY DELEGATE LEGISLATIVE POWER?
The Act delegates three important powers to the Coastal Resources Commission. 51 The Commission is responsible for the prep46. See, e.g., Solsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
47. A recent statement of the traditional "minimal scrutiny" test is as follows: "if,
upon judicial hypothesis, any state of facts might be conceived of which would indicate
a rational. . . basis for the ordinance, it must be sustained." Boraas v. Village of Belle
Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). However, if a statute creates a suspect classification such as race, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), or alienage, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973), the statute must
be justified by a showing that the state's purpose is "substantial," "overriding," "compelling" or "important." Id. at 722 n.9.
48. Statutes which impinge on "fundamental" interests, such as the right to travel,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), or the right to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972), must be justified by more than a minimal, hypothetical relationship to a legitimate state purpose. The Court has not held that the right to use property free of police power regulations of a particular type is a "fundamental" interest.
49. Planning, zoning and subdivision regulation powers are available to North Carolina counties and cities. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-320 to -375 (1974); id. §§ 160A360 to -455 (1972).
50. The Supreme Court recently applied the "minimal scrutiny" or "rational basis"
test to a zoning regulation in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
51. The Coastal Resources Commission is established by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-
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aration, adoption and amendment of "state guidelines for the coastal
area. 5 2 Also, it is responsible for designating "areas of environmental concern. 53 Finally, it acts as a permit-letting agency for major development projects as defined by the Act.54
In the performance of the first two of these functions the Commission will be acting in an administrative rule-making capacity. 55 In
acting as a permit-letting authority, the Commission will be engaged
in administrative adjudication. It is possible that aggrieved coastal
area landowners will contend that in connection with one or more of
these functions the General Assembly has delegated to the Commission
"legislative" power which the State constitution requires ,to be exercised only by the General Assembly.
The so-called "non-delegation doctrine" in North Carolina is
based on interpretations of article I, section 6, and article ]1, section 1,
of the State constitution. These provisions require -that the legislative,
executive and judicial powers be kept separate and distinct, and that
the legislative power of the State be vested in the General Assembly. An
attempt by the General Assembly to delegate legislative power to an executive agency would violate these two provisions.
This is not a simple doctrine. 56 The exigencies of twentieth
century government require that state legislatures delegate -to administrative agencies power that might be characterized as "policy-making
power" and therefore legislative in nature. The key to an intelligent
application of this doctrine is an understanding that, while delegations
of power to administrative agencies are necessary, such transfers of
power should be closely monitored to insure that the decision-making
by the agency is not arbitrary and unreasoned and that the agency is
not asked to make important policy choices which might just as easily be made by the elected representatives in the legislature.
As the non-delegation doctrine has traditionally been stated by
state courts, the central inquiry is whether the transfer of power to
104 (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3). The Commission consists of
fifteen members appointed by the Governor. Three of the fifteen are designated as atlarge members. The other twelve must be connected with or experienced in an area
of interest deemed to be relevant to coastal area problems--marine ecology, coastal forestry, the financing of coastal land development or local government in the coastal area.
52. Id. §§ 113A-106 to -108.
53. Id. §§ 113A-113 to -115.
54. Id. §§ 113A-118 to -122.
55. Id. §§ 113A-107(e), -113(a).
56. See generally 1 F. CooPER, STATE ADMiNsTRATivE LAw ch. 3 (1965); 1 K,
DAvIS, AD1mrmTITAT1Ve_ LAW 7.TSE §§ 2..07-.13 (Supp. 1970).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

the agency includes adequate "guiding standards" 7 to govern the exercise of the power. While statutory standards certainly are relevant
to whether the power delegated might be exercised arbitrarily and
while the absence of standards might be indicative of legislative abdi-

cation of its policy-making function, the "standards" test has been
subjected to considerable criticism. This test involves an inconsistent
and superficial examination of verbal formulae without any significant effort to explain results in terms of underlying policy. 5s
The opinions of the North Carolina Supreme Court on questions

of delegation focus on the adequacy of standards. In an early case,
Durham Provision Co. v. Daves,5' the court articulated certain general principles regarding questions of delegation: the General Assembly may not abdicate its powers to make laws;60 however, the constitution does not preclude the General Assembly from establishing policies and standards and leaving to agencies the determination of facts
to which the policy is to apply. 6

These principles have been applied by the court in a considerable
number of cases,6 but a review of some of the major cases indicates varying approaches by the court. Carolina-Virginia Coastal
Highway v. Coastal Turnpike Authority13 considered whether a statute
granting the Municipal Board of Control the power to create a munic-

ipal corporation to construct a toll road was an unlawful delegation
of legislative power.

The statute authorized the Board to determine

whether the proposed toll road was "in the public interest."0 4 There
was virtually no other substantive standard governing incorporation.
In invalidating the statute, the court characterized -the determination of

whether a toll road is "in the public interest" as a question involving
"vital public policy requiring ,the exercise of discriminating legislative
57. See 1 F. Coopin, supra note 56, at 54-70.
58. See generally 1 F. CooPER,supra note 56; 1 K. DAVIs, supra note 56. Professor Davis observes: "on few subjects are state court opinions characteristically so empty
of effective thinking; the typical opinion strings together some misleading legal clich6s
and announces the conclusion." Id. at 102.
59. 190 N.C. 7, 128 S.E. 593 (1925).
60. Id. at 11, 128 S.E. at 594, quoting T. CooLErY, CONSTrrTTONAL I2MITATIONS
137 (6th ed. 1890).
61. 190 N.C. at 10-11, 128 S.E. at 594.
62. E.g., Martin v. North Carolina Housing Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665
(1970); State Educational Assistance Authority v. Bank of Statesville, 276 N.C. 576,
174 S.E.2d 551 (1970); Harvell v. Scheidt, 249 N.C. 699, 107 S.E.2d 549 (1959); Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway v. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 237 N.C. 52, 74 S.E.2d
310 (1953); Cox v. City of Kinston, 217 N.C. 391, 8 S.E.2d 252 (1940).
63. 237 N.C. 52, 74 S.E.2d 310 (1953).
64. Id. at 56, 63, 74 S.E.2d at 313, 318.
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statecraft-particularly so in view of the existence of our statewide system of highways . . . and the recently created 'North Carolina Turnpike Authority' with power and authority to lay out, construct and operate turnpikes and toll roads on a statewide basis.1 65
The result in Coastal Highway seems correct. In view of the
importance of the question of a coherent transportation network, the
statute's lack of policy standards is quite surprising. Moreover the
Municipal Board of Control, the agency to which the power was transferred, had no particular expertise in making highway-location decisions. Thus the statute presented the possibility of arbitrary and unreasoned decisions and an abdication of legislative direction on state
policy.
A different result was reached under a similar statute in North
Carolina Turnpike Authority v. Pine Island, Inc.66 A statute empowered the Authority to construct turnpikes at locations within the State
"determined by the Authority and approved by the State Highway
Commission.""' The Commission was required to certify that a turnpike project would not be injurious to the roads within the State highway system.68 The Authority decided to construct an Outer Banks
Turnpike, the Commission issued a certificate evidencing its approval
and the Authority sought a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the statute.
The court held -that with respect to the location of the turnpikes
the statute delegated power with "reasonable standards which are as
specific as the circumstances permit."6 9 The court found a similar
Indiana case persuasive. That case suggested that the standards in
question were no broader than the standards used in delegations to
state highway commissions7" and that the locations would of necessity
be selected from the standpoint of generating sufficient toll revenue to
finance the project, a factor which would operate as a standard. 71
Pine Island did not distinguish Coastal Highway. One can surmise that a specialized agency acting only with the approval of another specialized agency was less susceptible to arbitrary decision-making, in the courts view, than was the Municipal Board of Control. It
65. Id. at 63, 74 S.E.2d at 318.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

265 N.C. 109, 143 S.E.2d 319 (1965).
Id. at 111, 143 S.E.2d at 321.
Id.
Id. at 115, 143 S.E.2d at 323.
Id. at 114, 143 S.E.2d at 323.
Id.
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is clear, however, that the difference in results is not explicable in terms
of standards. The only discernible difference between the two cases
is the express public interest standard in Coastal Highway. There
was no standard governing the Authority's determination in Pine Island
except the requirement of approval by the Commission.
72
In State Education Assistance Authority v. Bank of Statesville
the delegation of decisionmaking power was to the agency authorized
to issue bonds to finance student loans. Here the delegation issue before the court was whether the statute provided sufficient standards
for making student loans. 78 By interpreting the statute to permit the
Authority to make only such student loans as would qualify for federal
assistance under federal interest subsidy and guaranty programs, 4
sufficient standards were found in federal legislation rather than in
the State statute.
The result in Education Assistance Authority was reached by analyzing the purpose of the State statute and recognizing that the General Assembly intended the State loan program to be consistent with
the federal programs. In order to achieve these goals it was necessary
to avoid making the State program so rigid that it could not adapt to
changes in the federal assistance program.75 Thus the General Assembly did not abdicate its responsibilities; nor did it delegate power
which could be exercised arbitrarily. The court was sensitive to the
practical problems facing the General Assembly and indicated its willingness to look beyond the face of the statute for the adequate guiding standards.
Martin v. North Carolina Housing Corp.76 is the most recent major pronouncement by the court on the non-delegation doctrine. The
Housing Corporation was established as a public agency to provide housing for low income persons. A taxpayer alleged that the statute unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to 'the Corporation to determine what persons and families would be eligible for its assistance.
The statute permitted the Corporation to determine eligibility by taking into consideration without limitation, such factors as indicia of economic status.77 Despite the fact that the list of five factors was ex72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

276 N.C. 576, 174 S.E.2d 551 (1970).
Id. at 582, 174 S.E.2d at 556.
Id. at 589-92, 174 S.E.2d at 560-63.
Id. at 592, 174 S.E.2d at 562.
277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665 (1970).
Id. at 55, 175 S.E.2d at 680,
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pressly made both non-exhaustive ("without limitation') and non-specific ("such factors as") the court summarily upheld the validity of
the statute. The opinion includes no discussion of the issue.
It is extremely difficult to generalize from the North Carolina
cases about the state of the non-delegation doctrine. For purposes of
analysis of the Coastal Area Act, it may be significant that the comprehensive and important programs established by the General Assembly that were questioned in Martin and Education Assistance Authority
survived the non-delegation doctrine attack despite the fact that it
was theoretically possible in both cases for the General Assembly to
have drafted more specific standards. It may also be significant that
in the cases in which the legislation was upheld, the agency to which
power was delegated was a specialized agency with presumptive expertise in the subject matter of the statutory program.
Like -the agencies in Pine Island, Martin, and Education Assistance Authority, the Coastal Resources Commission is an agency created for a single purpose. Moreover, the Commission's composition
gives assurance of some degree of familiarity with the nature of -the
problems with which it has been asked to deal."' And the Act that
gives the Commission its power, like the statutes in Martin and Education Assistance Authority, is an important, comprehensive and
carefully considered enactment. The Act's emphasis on close state and
local cooperation results not only in a number of procedural safeguards against arbitrary decisionmaking but also insures that for critical matters the regulatory agency will have -the benefit of input from
informed and interested persons.
Nonetheless, the guiding standards set forth in the Act are not
very specific and a plausible argument can be made that they are constitutionally inadequate. Perhaps the most extreme example of the
absence of standards is the delegation of power to formulate guidelines
for the coastal area. The statutory language relevant to the Commission's obligation to establish state guidelines is as follows: "The Commission shall be responsible for 'the preparation, adoption, and amend' 79
ment of State guidelines.
State guidelines for the coastal area shall consist of statements of
objectives, policies, and standards to be followed in public and
78. N.C. GFN. STAT. § 113A-194 (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no.
3); see note 51 supra; Heath, supra note 3, at 364-66.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT, 113A-107(b) (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet

po. 3),
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private use of land and water areas within the coastal area. Such
guidelines shall be consistent with the goals of the coastal area
management system as set forth in G.S. § 113A-102. They shall
give particular attention to the nature of development which shall
be appropriate within the various types of areas of environmental
concern that may be designated by the Commission .... so
The statute obligates the Commission to submit proposed guidelines
to the coastal area local governments and to other private and governmental agencies deemed by it to have relevant expertise in advance of adoption of the final guidelines, and copies of the proposed
guidelines are to be made available to the public.8 1
The language of the Act clearly suggests that the Commission is
to establish "objectives, policies and standards" respecting the appropriate use of land and water resources in the coastal area. The Act
establishes few explicit standards to guide the Commission in establishing the guidelines. However, this is a power which must be exercised
in accordance with the procedures established by the new Administrative Procedure Act 2 and by the Coastal Area Act,8 3 which provide
some assurance that the Commission will make reasoned decisions.
Moreover, it can be argued that some additional but implicit standards can be identified.
The guidelines are to be consistent with the purposes of the Act
set forth in section 113A-102. To be sure, 'those purposes are rather
broadly defined; it is difficult, however, to imagine how the General
Assembly could have articulated purposes with greater specificity in
an Act designed to create a system for decisionmaking with respect to a
wide variety of economic, social, and environmental concerns8 4
Moreover, one of the purposes of the Act is to integrate the various
special permit procedures previously established for development activities in the coastal area. s5 The standards of those earlier regula80. Id. § 113A-107(a).
81. Id. § 113A-107(c).
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 150A (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no.
5). The Administrative Procedure Act requires that agencies must hold hearings in the
course of rulemaking and "offer any person an opportunity to present data, views and
arguments." Notice of such hearings must include "[a] statement of the terms or substance of the proposed rule." Id. § 150A-12(a).
83. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
84. The purposes of the Act were deliberately stated in general terms. The major
object of the Act is the creation of a special land use management system which will
resolve some of the policy conflicts generated by increasing development pressures in
the coastal area. See note 5 supra.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-125 (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no.
3); see Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 292.
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tory efforts, together with the expressed purposes of the Act, establish some boundaries for the standards, objectives, and policies which
are to be established in the guidelines. Those boundaries can be further defined by reference to the statutes delegating to cities and counties -the power to engage in planning, zoning and subdivision regulation, in which the General Assembly has established permissible objectives with respect to land use regulation.8 6 This entire collection of
policy statements can be considered together with other legislative pro37
nouncements such as those regarding air and water quality control
and highway location88 to establish a mosaic of legislative determinations which, may be taken together to establish "standards" for the
promulgation of guidelines. Thus in establishing the guidelines the
Commission will not be operating in a vacuum. Its task is to develop
a coherent set of standards for decisionmaking with respect to a
unique area of the State. It will do so in the context of -the various
regulatory powers previously defined by the General Assembly. In
view of the difficulty of the task, it is unlikely that the Commission,
composed of persons familiar with the coastal area, many of whom
are representatives of the local governments in the coastal area, will
not be able to perform this task more efficiently than and at least as
responsibly as the General Assembly.
In addition to these implicit standards, arbitrariness is avoided
because the procedures established by the Act for the development of
the guidelines are designed to give all interested parties an opportunity
to present their views to the Commission. The preparation of the
guidelines is a process which will be carried on in public with a number of opportunities for the General Assembly, -the local governments,
landowners, and other interested members of the public to monitor the
process. Under these circumstances the opportunities for arbitrary or
ill-informed decisionmaking seem quite minimal.
If the court accepts the arguments that the nature of the subject
matter makes it unlikely that the General Assembly could effectively
have stated more specific standards governing the process of establishing guidelines, and that the Commission will be acting in the open with
input from the public and from local governments, and will be acting
against the background of a number of legislative policy statements
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-320 to -347 (1974); id. §§ 160A-360 to -407
(1972).
87. Id. §§ 143-211, -215 to -269 (1974).
88. E.g., id. § 136-45.
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embodied in land and water regulation legislation, it seems unlikely
that a non-delegation attack will succeed here. Certainly in this regard, the situation presented by the Act is no less constitutional than
those presented to the court in Pine Island, Education Assistance Authority and Martin.
Turning to another delegation issue raised by the Act, the statutory language governing the power of the Commission to designate
areas of environmental concern is as follows:
The. . . Commission shall by rule designate geographic areas of
the coastal area as areas of environmental concern and specify
the boundaries thereof, in the manner provided in this Part ....
The Commission may designate as areas of environmental concern
any one or more of the following, singly or in combination: [There
follows a list of seven types of land and water areas within which
areas of environmental concern may be designated] . . . . Additional grounds for designation of areas of environmental concern are prohibited unless enacted into law by an act of the General Assembly. 89
The areas of environmental concern are to be designated by a rule
making procedure which follows public hearings in the counties in
which ,the lands proposed to be so designated are located. 0
While it is clear that the Commission has no power to designate
as an area of environmental concern land which does not fall into one
of the seven listed categories, the Act offers little guidance to the Commission in choosing which of those land and water areas to so designate.
Like the establishment of state guidelines, the designation of areas
of environmental concern will take place in accordance with the procedures established by the Coastal Area Act and by the Administrative Procedure Act. Interested persons will have an opportunity to be heard.
The decisionmaking process will be subject to public scrutiny. Also,
since the task requires specific knowledge of the coastal lands and waters, this is particularly a type of decision which the Commission is at
least as well equipped to make as the General Assembly.
Moreover, Pine Island and Martin both suggest that the Act
should not be vulnerable here. Pine Island suggests that the power
to designate highway locations-roughly analogous to the designation
of areas of environmental concern-is a fit subject for delegation. In
89. Id. § 113A-113(a)-(b) (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).

90, Id.

113A-11;5,
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that case the only effective standards were the implied financial incentive and the check provided by the requirement of Highway Commission approval. Here, the specialized agency will be operating in
an open process with ample opportunity for local governments and
coastal area landowners to express approval. Moreover, here there
are rather stringent standards confining -the Commission's choice to
within the seven categories. A comparison to the non-exclusive and
exemplary list of factors in Martin suggests that -the court will hold
that in the Act the General Assembly has established acceptable guiding standards for the designation of areas of environmental concern.
A third delegation issue is raised by the permit-letting power that
is granted to the Commission. The statute sets forth eight standards
which govern the process of granting or denying permits. Some of the
standards leave the Commission with considerable discretion: permits may be denied when the proposed development would result in
"major or irreversible damage ' 91 to certain resources or interests,
would "unreasonably endanger life or property"9 2 or (piling delegation on delegation) would be "inconsistent with the state guidelines or
local land use plans."9' 3
The procedures for consideration of permit applications are quite
formal. Hearings are to be preceded by notice, full and complete records are to be kept, procedures applicable in civil actions in superior
court are to be followed insofar as practicable, and decisions are -to be
supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.9 4
It is the permit-letting process which is most likely to engender
litigation. In this arena, economic expectations will be forced to compete most directly with environmental concerns. Here the impact of
arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking is most likely to be felt; despite the requirement for a public hearing, these proceedings may not
attraot as much public attention as will the Commission's rule-making
proceedings. It can be argued therefore that it is with respect to this
process that the need for adequate guiding standards is most acute.
The adequacy of the standards governing the permit-letting process established by -the Act probably is determined by Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Aldermen9 5 in which the court upheld against a
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.§ 113A-120(a)(4).
Id.§ 113A-120(a)(6).
Id.§ 113A-120(a)(8).
Id.§ 113A-122.
284 N.C. 458, 202 S.E.2d 129 (1974).
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non-delegation challenge the standards of the Chapel Hill zoning ordinance which governed the issuance of special use permits by the
town's governing board. Similar questions had previously been presented to the court in Jackson v. Board of Adjustment0 and Keiger v.
Board of Adjustment.97 In Jackson the court struck down Guilford
County's delegation to its zoning board of the power to grant special
use permits upon a finding by the board that "the granting of the special exception will not adversely affect the public interest."0 8 The
court found that the "public interest" standard constituted "the power
to make a different rule of law, case by case '9 9 because the standard
made the "determinative factor" for the grant or denial of a permit or
exception "the opinion of [the] . . . board" as to the desirability or
undesirability of the activity for which the exception was sought. 100
Two years later in Keiger, the court considered whether the special use permit procedures of the Winston-Salem zoning ordinance
violated the non-delegation doctrine. The court held that a denial of
a special use permit application on the ground that the proposed use
would not be in accord with the "purpose and intent" of the ordinance
was an exercise of legislative power by the Winston-Salem Board of
Adjustment.' 0 '
The Winston-Salem ordinance provided 'that special use permit
application decisions were to be based on "the information submitted,
the findings of the City-County Planning Board, the purpose and intent of this ordinance and the public interest." 02 Relying on Jackson,
Judge Exum in the Superior Court ruled that the phras "and the
public interest" should be disregarded.' 0 3 Petitioners appealed from
Judge Exum's affirmance of the zoning board's denial of their application on the ground that a delegation of decision-making power to the
zoning board based on "the purpose and intent of this ordinance" was
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
The supreme court agreed. It examined the "purpose and intent"
clause of the zoning ordinance and found that the purposes set forth
there were essentially the purposes stated in the zoning enabling act.1°"
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

275 N.C. 155, 166 S.E.2d 78 (1969).
278 N.C. 17, 178 S.E.2d 616 (1971).
275 N.C. at 159, 166 S.E.2d at 81.
Id. at 165, 166 S.E.2d at 85.
Id.
278 N.C. at 22-23, 178 S.E.2d at 619-20.
Id. at 21, 178 S.E.2d at 619.
Id. at 19, 178 S.E.2d at 617.
Id. at 22-23, 178 S.E.2d at 619-20.
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These, said the court, were the purposes for which the General Assembly delegated power to Winston-Salem's legislative body, the Board of
Aldermen.
In the exercise of this grant of power by the Board of Aldermen,
the 14.5-acre site was included in a B-3 zone, where, according to
the Ordinance, the construction of a mobile home park is a conditional permissible use. Precise conditions were set forth by the
Board of Aldermen as requirements for the granting of a special
or conditional use permit by the Board of Adjustment. Petitioners
complied with these requirements. It would constitute an unlawful
delegation of the legislative power vested by the General Assembly
in the Board of Aldermen of Winston-Salem to allow the Board
of Adjustment to deny such permit on the ground it did not consider the use specified in the Ordinance as a conditional permissible use to be in accord with the "purpose and intent" of the Ordinance. We perceive no substantial difference between the denial
of a permit on the ground the conditional use is adverse to the
public interest and the denial thereof on the ground the conditioned use is not in accord with the "purpose and intent" of the
Ordinance.105
These cases set the stage for attacks on the adequacy of -the
standards governing the Chapel Hill special use permit procedure.
The Chapel Hill ordinance required that a special use permit be
granted only when the granting agency made four findings. 1°6 The
required findings included the following: "that the use [if located
where proposed] will not materially endanger the public health or
safety . . . [and] will be . . . in general conformity with the plan of
It can be argued that these two required find. . . Chapel Hill.""'
ings are functionally identical to the standards struck down in Jackson
and Keiger as requiring the opinions and therefore the policy preferences of the permit granting agency. However, direct attacks on the
adequacy of these standards were twice rejected by the court of appeals in 1972.1°8
Subsequently, the Board of Aldermen denied a special use permit
for Humble Oil Company to build a gas station on Chapel Hill's
major commercial street. Humble attacked the denial and was successful in persuading the supreme court that Chapel Hill's process of
considering special use permit applications was procedurally deficient.
105. Id. at 23, 178 S.E.2d at 620.
106. CHAPEL HILL, N.C., ZONING ORDINANCE § 4(B) (1973).
107. Id.
108. Carter v. Town of Chapel Hill, 14 N.C. App. 93, 187 S.E.2d 583 (1972); Kenan v. Board of Adjustment, 13 N.C. App. 688, 187 S.E.2d 496 (1972).
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In an opinion written by Justice Sharp, the court held that in permit-letting procedures of this type "the party whose rights are being
adjudicated" is entitled to "all essential elements of a fair trial" including the right to cross-examine and that the findings of the permit-letting agency in support of a denial must be supported by "competent,
material and substantial evidence."' 10 9
Humble had additionally attacked the Chapel Hill ordinance as
having insufficient standards to govern the permit-letting process. After
articulating its "substantial evidence" test the court dealt with the nondelegation attack as follows:
Some of the ordinance requirements are specific; others, not susceptible of exact definition, are necessarily stated in general terms.
In our view the ordinance achieves reasonable specificity. Safeguards against arbitrary action by zoning boards in granting or denying special use permits are not only to be found in specific guidelines for their action. Equally important is the requirement that in
each instance the board (1) follow the procedures specified in the
ordinance; (2) conduct its hearings in accordance with fair-trial
standards; (3) base its findings of fact only upon competent, material and substantial evidence; and, (4) in allowing or denying
the application, it state the basic facts on which it relied with sufficient specificity to inform the parties, as well as the court, what induced its decision. 1 0
The significance of the Humble Oil opinion for an analysis of the
Act is that the procedures outlined in section 113A-120 to govern permit letting are substantially identical to the procedures mandated in
Humble Oil and that, in terms of specificity, the findings required by
the Act are no less satisfactory than those required by the Chapel Hill
ordinance."' It seems likely therefore that the court will reject a
non-delegation attack on the Commission's exercise of the permit-letting authority.
The question of delegation of legislative power is not a legal issue
109. 284 N.C. at 470, 202 S.E.2d at 138.
110. Id. at 471, 202 S.E.2d at 138.
111. In both cases the decision-makers are required to make findings which are reflections of informed opinion as to what the public interest requires. The Chapel Hill ordinance requires a finding that the proposed use will not "materially endanger the public
health or safety." Section 113A-120(6) requires that a denial must be based on a finding that the development would occur "in such a manner as to unreasonably endanger
life or property." The words "materially" and "unreasonably" both admit to considerable elasticity; both standards are very much like general statements describing typical
legislative police power judgments. If the Chapel Hill standards, coupled with an adequate procedure, are acceptable to the court, it is likely that the standards of section
113A-120 will also be acceptable.

19741

COASTAL AREA MANAGEMENT

327

which is susceptible to fully satisfactory analysis. One has the sense
in reading the cases that prediction of the outcome of any dispute
framed in terms of this issue is nearly impossible. The court itself has
recognized that the line between legislative and administrative powers
is unclear and imprecise. However, the recent cases dealing with the
subject suggest some tenative conclusions. It appears that the court
has been responsive to and has approved legislation which has been
carefully drawn to minimize the possibility of arbitrary administrative
decisionmaking and administrative decisionmaking which involves
the formulation of major policies for the state; although the test of
constitutionality is couched in terms of adequacy of standards, it is
difficult to explain the results in Pine Island and Martin in terms of
standards alone. If the underlying policies are perceived to be prevention of arbitrariness and a sense that where possible the General
Assembly should articulate policy, it would appear that the delegations
of power to the Coastal Resources Commission are constitutional. The
Act deals with subject matter which is not susceptible to precise formulations of policy by a legislative body; the Commission, aided by professional staff, is in a better position to make the factual determinations required for a coordinated coastal area policy within the parameters established by the General Assembly. Moreover, the Act is replete with safeguards against arbitrary action; the courts, the local
governments, the General Assembly and the public will be watching
with care the actions of the Commission.
IV. THE TAMINGS ISSUE
Proposals for environmentally sensitive land use regulation often
generate strong political opposition based on fear that such regulation
will destroy or substantially diminish property values. This, it is said,
is confiscation. In connection with coastal area regulation this fear
is understandable; the goals of such regulation might necessarily require the preservation of dunes, beaches and wetlands in, or near, their
natural states. The constitutional doctrine which reflects societal unwillingness -to tolerate uncompensated "confiscation" is the complex
and somewhat mystifying "takings" doctrine, which, in its various
formulations, attempts to define the outer limits of permissible uncompensated regulation.
Unlike most land use regulation measures, the Act attempts to codify a test for determining when a regulatory order passes beyond the
permissible bounds of the police power and becomes an invalid tak-
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ing. The statutory test requires that a court determine whether an order (presumably a development permit denial) so restricts the use of
property so as to deprive the landowner of "the practical uses thereof.' 1 2 The key to understanding this test is the phrase "practical
uses." Although the test appears to focus only on the extent to which
some uses-presumably remunerative ones-are left to the landowner,
it is more likely that the words "practical uses" are actually a shorthand reference to a balancing test which would have been applied by
the North Carolina courts in the absence of any statutory guidance." 8
This balancing test probably will permit rather extensive regulation
under the Act.
The modem doctrine defining the takings issue in terms of a balance between the extent of harm to a landowner and the degree of
police power protection afforded the public finds its origins in Mr.
Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.'"
There the question was the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Kohler
Act which prohibited the extraction of anthracite coal in such a manner to cause subsidence of surface property where the surface was improved for residential use or for city streets." 5 The coal company
had sold its estate in the surface of land, reserving the right to mine
coal and a contractual commitment from the vendees permitting the
company to mine so as to cause subsidence on notice to the surface
owner. The Kohler Act would have precluded such mining.
Over a strong dissent by Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Holmes
held the Kohler Act unconstitutional. While conceding that nearly all
police power regulations deprive landowners of some value, Holmes
held that a constitutional line must be drawn or else government
could accomplish the appropriation of property in the guise of regulation. The police power, said Holmes, "must have its limits . . . [O]ne

factor for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of diminution [of value].""
Holmes noted that the effect of the Kohler
Act was to leave the coal company without any effective rights of ownership in its estate in the coal in place. This clearly was an important
factor in his determination that the Pennsylvania statute was unconstitutional.
112.
no. 3).
113.
114.
115.
116.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-123(b) (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet
See text accompanying notes 126-41 infra.
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Id. at 412-13, 414-15.
Id. at 413.
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Pennsylvania Coal might be thought -to stand for the simple proposition that, when the entire use-value of property ownership is destroyed by government regulation, the regulation is invalid. However, the opinion is more usefully understood to articulate a balancing
test in which the extent of loss of the attributes of ownership by the
landowner is weighed against the degree to which the general public
is protected from harmful activity by the regulation in question. Just
as it is clear that Holmes saw the Kohler Act as leaving the owner of
the coal with literally no attributes of ownership, it is clear that he saw
the purpose of the Act as being of limited public scope and importance. "The extent of the public interest is shown by the statute to be
limited, since the statute ordinarily does not apply to land when the
surface is owned by the owner of the coal. Furthermore, it is not justified as a protection of personal safety. That could be provided for
117
by notice."
That the Supreme Court's approach to the takings issue has not
rested solely on a diminution of value analysis but rather on a balancing test is indicated both by its older cases, such as Hadacheck v.
Sebastian"8 in which a nearly ninety percent reduction in value was
permitted and by its most recent pronouncement in Goldblatt v. Town
of Hempstead,"9 which held that a quarry owner failed to meet the
burden of proving that an ordinance prohibiting excavation below the
water table was invalid as a taking of his thirty-eight acre tract of
land. The Court said: "There is no set formula to determine where
regulation ends and taking begins."' 0 It quoted from its opinion in
Mugler v. Kansas'2 ' for the proposition that "'[A] prohibition simply
upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid leg117. Id. at 413-14.
118. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
119. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).

For useful discussions of the history of the developBOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES &
I. BANTA, THE TAKING IssuE 114-38 (1973); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YAL L.. 36, 37-46 (1964).
120. 369 U.S. at 594.
121. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). This opinion, written by the first Mr. Justice Harlan,
reflects a view of the taking problem which is somewhat different than the Holmes caseby-case balancing test. Mugler involved the validity of a prohibition of the manufacture
and sale of liquor as applied to a brewery enacted prior to enactment of the statute. Mr.
Justice Harlan found the statute valid in an opinion which emphasized the fact that the
state was merely regulating "noxious" conduct and literally was not appropriating or taking any property interests. Emphasis here was on the constitutional terms "taking" and
"property." Property does not include the right to injure the public; a regulation is not
an appropriation. This highly conceptualized approach to the problem may have modem adherents. See Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).

ment of the takings doctrine in the Supreme Court see F.
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islation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit.' "122 The Court also cited

Pennsylvania Coal for the proposition that a comparison of values
before and after regulation is relevant but "by no means conclu23
sive."1'
Goldblatt examined the ordinance in question:

"[To] evaluate

its reasonableness we therefore need to know such things as the nature of the menace against which it will protect, the availability and

effectiveness of other less drastic protective steps, and the loss which
appellants will suffer from the imposition of the ordinance. '124 The
record in the case was insufficiently complete to enable the Court to
satisfactorily weigh the various factors. However, the Court clearly
suggested that even if the public benefit was seen as de minimis, it was
possible that the impact on the landowner also was de minimis; in
25
such circumstances the ordinance would have been held valid.1

Within a year of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Goldblatt, apparently restating the notion of federal law that an examination of diminished value alone would not be conclusive,12 0 the
27
North Carolina Supreme Court decided Helms v. City of Charlotte,1

which appears to establish a balancing test and apparently is the
source of the "practical uses" test set forth in the Act. 128 Helms in122. 369 U.S. at 593, quoting 123 U.S. at 668-69.
123. 369 U.S. at 594.
124. Id. at 595.
125. Id. at 595-96.
126. Commentators who have examined carefully the opinions of the Supreme
Court on the taking issue find it difficult to articulate a single doctrinal test which is
applied by that Court. Professor Joseph Sax developed the impression "that the Court
has settled upon no satisfactory rationale for the cases and operates somewhat haphazardly, using any or all of the available, often conflicting theories without developing any
clear approach to the constitutional problem." Sax, supra note 119, at 46. The available theories are described quite concisely in Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality
of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE LI. 1119, 1127-30 (1964). Professor Arvo Van Alstyne has
noted that "[1judicial efforts to chart a usable test for determining when police power
measures impose constitutionally compensable burdens have, on the whole, been notably
unsuccessful. With some exceptions, the decisional law is largely characterized by confusing and incompatible results, often explained in conclusionary terminology, circular
reasoning and empty rhetoric." Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging By Police Power:
The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1, 2 (1971). For
purposes of analysis of the Act, the importance of the doctrinal confusion in this area
is that it indicates that state and federal constitutional law has not adopted a diminution
of value test as the sole and controlling factor in setting limits on the police power.
127. 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1961).
128. See text accompanying note 113 supra. The text of section 113A-123(b) of
the Act is, with slight exceptions, identical to the language of the Coastal Wetlands Act,
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volved the validity of an amendment to the zoning ordinance of the
city of Charlotte. Mr. Helms purchased two lots which had been
placed in an industrial district until an amendment in 1957 restricted
the lots to residential uses. The surface of the lots was six to eight
feet below the grade level of the abutting street. Mr. Helms sought
and received a permit to bury oil tanks on the lot by filling the lots
to street level. Subsequently he applied for a permit to construct a
small office building on the lots in which he intended to operate an
oil distribution business. The permit was denied. 2 9 Mr. Helms then
sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance reclassifying his lots
was invalid. The superior court held the ordinance valid despite finding that the lots were worth one-third as much for residential use as
for industrial use. The superior court also found that Mr. Helms could
build a conforming (albeit small) residence on the lots. 3 0
On appeal the State supreme court remanded the case with direction that the trial court "hear evidence and determine whether or not
the lots in question are, under all the circumstances, practical and of
any reasonable value for residential use."',' The important point in
the Helms case itself is that the court was unwilling to conclude that
an "unsightly and out of line' residence on the lots which might have
been built in conformity with the zoning ordinance was nonetheless a
reasonable or practical use; the court did not, on the state of the record, however, hold the ordinance invalid. 32 Instead it held that the
trial court had not properly defined its scope of inquiry in answering
the question: "[Is] it practical to use the lots for residential purposes
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-230(f) (Supp. 1974).

See Heath supra note 3, at 395-96.
The discussion in the remainder of this section is predicated on two propositions:
(1) the judgment that Helms sets forth a balancing test as opposed to a single-focus
value diminution test; and (2) the assumption that in drafting the Act (and the Coastal
Wetlands Act) the General Assembly intended to codify the approach of the court in
Helms rather than repudiate or modify it. The first proposition is a matter of case analysis on which attorneys can and will differ. The second proposition is an historical
judgment which to my knowledge is not supported by written documentation, but by an
assumption that if the legislative draftsmen had intended to modify the Helms test they
would have done so with greater clarity.
129. 255 N.C. at 649, 122 S.E.2d at 819.
130. Id. at 649-50, 122 S.E.2d at 819-20.
131. Id. at 657, 122 S.E.2d at 825.
132. The court disagreed with the trial judge on whether the lots were sufficiently
large to permit lawful residential construction. Id. Presumably the case could have
been decided on this ground alone; if no residential use was legally possible, all use attributes of ownership would have been destroyed by the ordinance. See Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). However, the court accepted for purposes
of discussion the trial court's finding that the lots were of legally sufficient size for residtmtil ise. 255 N.C. at 657, 122 ..E.24 at 824,
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and do they have any reasonable value for residential use under zoning
regulations, the building code and other pertinent circumstances?" ' 8
The court indicated that this question could be answered only by
an evaluation of many factors.184 These factors included: (a) the
nature of the neighborhood surrounding the lots; (b) the character of
the traffic on the nearby street; (c) the effect on the neighborhood of
requiring that the only use of Helms' land be a house of "unique design"; (d) the possibility of variances from area and set-back requirements; (e) the market value of any residence constructed on the lots;
and, significantly, (f) "whether an unsightly and out-of-line residence
would be less injurious to nearby property than a business establish35

ment."'
The list of factors to be considered suggests that although the ul-

timate question is whether the uses remaining after regulation are
practical and of reasonable value, the words "practical" and "reasonable" take their content from all of the surrounding circumstances, including an assessment of the degree to which the regulation in fact protects the public from harmful activity. To borrow the analysis suggested in Goldblatt, it might be said that in Helms the public benefit
was de minimis while the burden on the landowner was substan36
tial.1
There can be no doubt that the focus of Helms is on the nature
of the uses permitted the landowner after regulation. This is understandable. Pennsylvania Coal teaches that regulation cannot so deprive the landowner of the use attributes of ownership to become, in
effect, an appropriation of his property. However there are some indications in the text of the Helms opinion that the court believes that
the question of the permissible degree of regulatory burden on a landowner can be measured only by reference to the degree to which the
regulation serves the public interest.
The court quoted from McQuillin on Municipal Corporations
for the proposition that in a particular case "'the preference of the public interest over the private interest"' must be determined on a case-bycase basis.' 37 Later in the opinion the court referred to the factors
133. 255 N.C. at 656, 122 S.E.2d at 824.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 656-57, 122 S.E.2d at 824.
136. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
137. 255 N.C. at 651, 122 S.E.2d at 820, quoting 8 E. MCQuILLIN, THE LAw or
MUNICIPAL Co uoRAnoNs 96-97 (1949).
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which'must 'be considered in determining whether a residential use
of the property is practical. The first is the nature of the surrounding
land uses. 1 8 This factor is relevant not only to the potential value of
a residence on the lots in question but also to whether the zoning regulation actually will protect the neighborhood from an incompatible
use. Finally, the court made -this consideration explicit by noting that
the ,trial court should consider "whether an unsightly and out of line
residence would be less injurious to nearby property than a business
establishment."'3 9
On the basis of this language it can be argued strongly that the
practical uses test of Helms is a balancing test in which the question of
whether a use remaining after regulation is practical will be determined
by measurement of the degree of harm to the landowner caused by the
regulation and the concomitant degree of public benefit afforded by
the regulation. If the courts read the language 'of the Act as referring to the Helms approach and read Helms as a balancing test, it is
likely that a regulatory order under the Act will survive a takings
challenge despite the fact that the landowner is left with no highly remunerative uses if the order is an otherwise reasonable exercise of the
police power in aid of important public objectives. An order which
prohibits intensive and environmentally harmful uses of marshlands
may not deprive a landowner of practical uses of the land: considering
the negative public consequences of such uses,' 4 0 the precluded uses
may not be characterized as "practical."
There can be little doubt that both the language of the Act and
the Helms opinion dictate that landowners must be left with land uses
which have a reasonable value. This does not mean that a landowner
is entitled to the highest and best use of his land. But, as in Pennsylvania Coal, the regulation cannot deprive the landowner of all of
the use attributes of ownership. Between these two extremes there is a
sliding scale on which the reasonableness of the uses remaining after
regulation will be measured by an analysis of the nature of the land
involved, its relation to surrounding land, .the purpose of the regula138. 255 N.C. at 656, 122 S.E.2d at 824.
139. Id. at 657, 122 S.E.2d at 824.
140. The proposition that coastal area beaches, dunes, marshes and estuaries are essential to the total ecology of the coastal area in preventing flooding and erosion and
in providing for the growth of marine life (including valuable fish) has been well explored in the legal literature. E.g., Schoenbaum, Public Rights and Coastal Zone Management, 51 N.C.L. Rnv. 1, 4 (1972); Note, State and Local Wetlands Regulation: The
Problem of Taking Without Just Compensation, 58 VA. L. Rev. 876, 877-78 (1972).
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tion and the degree to which the purpose of the regulation might be
achieved by less drastic means. 14
Analysis of these factors in the context of wetlands regulation is
not encouraging for those who hope for strong environmentally oriented regulation. Many of the cases considering stringent wetlands
regulations have found an invalid 'taking.1 42 Nevertheless, some cases
have upheld strong wetlands control, and it is arguable that increased
sensitivity to 'the ecological importance of the marshes may result in increasing judicial approval of strong public protection of those land
areas. The major difficulty with wetlands regulation is that, if we
continue to perceive property rights as the equivalent of development
rights and constitutionally -to protect the right of a landowner to recover an economic return from land which is inherently unsuited to
intensive development, we are defining ourselves into a constitutional
comer. It is very difficult to imagine very many remunerative uses of
beaches, dunes, and wetlands which do not require substantial changes
in the nature of the land to the considerable detriment of the public
interest in a productive coastal ecosystem.
One commentator has suggested a list of remunerative activities
which might be conducted on wetlands without much risk of environmental damage. These include: use of the marshlands for school
biology class field trips; permitting tourists to view the marshes from
walkways constructed over the land; economic use of the marshland
to insure a supply of migratory birds for hunting, thus relieving hunters
from ,the costs of importing wild fowl; charging access fees for nonpower boats; charging rental fees to commercial laboratories and television production crews for locations; charging fishermen for the economic value of marsh enrichment; and, charging neighboring land141. The idea that the possibility of less severe regulation has a bearing on the "takings" question is suggested by the language in Helms directing the trial court to consider
the possible effect of zoning variances on its analysis of the problem. 255 N.C. at 65657, 122 S.E.2d at 824. Presumably the court meant to suggest that variances from the
lot size, set-back or side-yard requirements might permit the city to accomplish its basic
objective-residential zoning-without imposing such a burden on Mr. Helms. Cf. Horton v. Gulledge, 277 N.C. 353, 177 S.E.2d 885 (1970).
142. E.g., Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation Dev.
Comn'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); Dooley v. Town Plan & Zone
Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964); State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me.
1970); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, - Mass -, 284 N.E.2d 891
(1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S.
Volpe & Co., 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965); Morris County Land Improvement
Co, v. Township of Parsipany-Troy Hills 40 N.j. 539, 193 A.24 232 (1963),
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owners for an unobstructed view of the marshlands. 143
This list is a good but unimpressive try, particularly when read
from the standpoint of a wetlands owner who believes that his property rights include his right to realize an economic return from rather
intensive development. From this perspective, few of these suggested
uses appear to be "practical" or of reasonable value. On the other
hand, the list of uses is quite realistic if we look at the nature of the
marshlands. Are such lands really suited for any remunerative development without undergoing rather substantial changes in identity
through dredging, filling and grading? If not, are such intensive uses
fully practical in the sense intended by Helms when it is considered that
the dredging, filling and grading will inevitably have a very negative
effect on the totality of a fragile ecosystem? 144 Because of these
unique ecological characteristics, wetlands may be not only unsuitable
for intensive development but also may be subject to the public trust
doctrine.14 5 If so, it can be argued that property rights in such lands
do not include the right to make changes in the character of -theland
required by intensive commercial, industrial, or residential development. Thus such uses could not be characterized as practical and the
calculus of determining whether -a landowner has been deprived of "all
practical uses so as to constitute a taking" of property must necessarily
146
reflect the limited use rights previously available to the owner. ,
The Act includes a rather interesting phrase which suggests that
the General Assembly intended that some permit denials under the procedures outlined by the Act would derive their authority from the public trust doctrine or from some other source independent of the Act.
143. Wilkes, Constitutional Dilemmas Posed by State Policies Against Marine Pollution-The Maine Example, 23 ME. L. REv. 143, 152 (1971).
144. See Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land As Property, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 1039, for a discussion of the idea that environmental goals may
require that we discontinue considering land as a commodity, the value of which is measured in terms of economic return on intensive development and begin to consider land
as an essential resource. That speculative values may not be appropriate for consideration in a "takings" case is suggested by Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbomton,
469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972), in which 510 acres of land owned by a developer was
re-zoned to impose 3 and 6 acre minimum lot size requirements. The court upheld the

ordinance.

"Lastly, we find little merit to appellant's contentions that the zoning ordi-

nance has resulted in a taking of appellant's property without just compensation .
[A]ppellant still has the land and buildings for which it paid $290,000. The estimated
worth, had Eappellant's] original plans been approved, is irrelevant." Id. at 963
(emphasis added).
145. See generally Schoenbaum, supra note 140; Comment, The Public Trust in
Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged TraditionalDoctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970),
146. $eg Juist v, ar.ettp County, 56 Wis. 7d 7, 201 NW.2d 761 (1972),
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The Act requires the superior court to determine whether the order deprives the owner of the land of the "practical uses thereof, being not
otherwise authorized by law, .....
147
The italicized phrase apparently is intended to refer to the word "order" earlier in the sentence
so that the practical use test is not to be applied to "orders" otherwise "authorized by law." This is not a clear statutory phrase; the
syntax is virtually unintelligible. However, the statute should be read
to make all of its provisions effective and the most sensible reading of
this phrase is that when the Commission denies a permit by way of
enforcement of the public trust doctrine (or from some other source of
authority) the practical use test is not strictly applicable, at least in
the sense that such an order is not a taking.
Just v. Marinette County, 48 a 1972 wetlands regulation case,
suggests that perspectives on the practical uses of wetlands similar to
those expressed above will receive judicial recognition. Just involved the validity of a county shoreland zoning ordinance as applied
to land fronting on a navigable lake in Wisconsin. The land was
classified as wetlands and the result of this classification was to require a conditional use permit to fill more than five hundred square
feet of the land.' 49 The landowners contended that the regulation constituted a taking. The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed in an
opinion which expresses a novel view of property rights in fragile ecosystems.
After stating some traditional formulations of the takings doctrine
and apparently accepting a balancing test as the operative doctrine,
the court said, "This case causes us to re-examine the concepts of public benefit in contrast to public harm and the scope of an owner's
right to use of his property."' 15 0 The court characterized the case before it as one in which the purpose of the regulation was to prevent
a harmful use of land rather than to secure a benefit for the public, a
dichotomy which has been used by courts and commentators to distinguish between public power regulations and exercises of eminent domain. It then expressed its understanding of the "interrelationship of
the wetlands, the swamps and the natural environment of shorelands
to the purity of the water and to such natural resources as navigation,
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-123(b) (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet
no. 3) (emphasis added).
148. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
149. Id. at 14, 201 N.W.2d at 766.
150. Id. at 16, 201 N.W.2d at 767.
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fishing, and scenic beauty."'' 1 From this premise the court seems to
have assumed, perhaps properly, that virtually any change in the natural character of wetlands is harmful to the ecosystem -and concluded,
from that assumption, that regulation, which in effect requires that
such land be left in its natural condition does not deprive the landowner of any property interest.
Is the ownership of a parcel of land so absolute that a man
can change its nature to suit any of his purposes?. .. An owner
of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential
natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which
it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of
others . . . [W]e think it is not an unreasonable exercise of [the
police power] to prevent harm to public
rights by limiting the use of
152
private property to its natural uses."'
The implications of this analytical approach are that the uses of
land for which a landowner may expect constitutional protection are
only those uses which may be made of land without detriment to the
public. In short, it is arguable that Just stands for the proposition
that since filling of shorelands cannot be accomplished without "upsetting the natural environment,"' 15 3 filling is not a use activity which
is one of the protected "bundle of sticks" comprising property. Thus,
in such a case private property rights are not implicated by the regulation. Indeed the court gave short shrift -to the landowner's claim
of diminution in value. "While loss of value is to be considered in determining whether a restriction is a constructive taking, value based
on changing the character of the land at the expense of harm to public rights is not an essential factor or controlling."' 5
The Just case is useful to supporters of strong regulation under
the Act insofar as it suggests that takings law should recognize that
certain types of land and water resources are so fragile and so important to the overall balance of an essential ecosystem 'that virtually
any intensive use will have adverse public consequences. If this perspective is accepted, it is difficult to characterize intensive development of the wetlands as practical uses. The only practical uses of
wetlands under this formulation are those which do not inevitably
cause a legislatively proscribed ecological imbalance.
Although the analysis of the Wisconsin court in Just is not incon151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

16-17, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
17, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
18, 201 N.W.2d at 768.
23, 201 N.W.2d at 771.
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sistent with -the language of the Act or the North Carolina court's approach in Helms, there is nothing in current North Carolina law
which clearly points to an acceptance of that analysis here. Indeed
the language of the Act and the Helms opinion may reflect a perspective on the scope of property rights which is considerably more traditional with greater emphasis being placed on the landowner's right
to make a remunerative use of property.
From the environmentalist standpoint the greatest dangers presented by the "practical use" language of the Act are (1) that it will
be read as establishing a takings test which focuses only on the extent to which a landowner's property interests are affected by the regulation and (2) that in analyzing the extent of value diminution,
courts will assume that landowners have an inherent property right to
receive some economic return even if the use proposed will inevitably
have harmful effects on other portions of the ecosystem. The antecedent of the Act's takings test is Helms. A careful analysis of that
opinion should indicate that -the word "practical" is to be given a
meaning in a given case under a balancing test which weighs the harm
to the landowner against the benefit to the public. Thus the test requires more than the answer to the single question whether the landowner can make some use of the land. Also, a sensitive appreciation
of the nature of the wetlands themselves and their importance to the
coastal ecosystem and all of its values, aesthetic, economic and social,
should permit courts to apply the balancing test with a firm understanding that the public interest in this type of regulation is so strong,
and the resources involved so fragile, that few highly remunerative uses
of wetlands can be deemed practical unless the word "practical" means,
in part, harmful to the public interest.
Creative advocacy, including a careful presentation of all relevant ecological and economic factors, will be crucial in "takings" litigation under the Act. The apparently limited focus of the language
of the Aot should not obscure the fact that the takings doctrine requires that a strong and persuasive presentation of the public interest
involved in wetlands regulation be made in every case.
V.

THE "PUBLIC USE" ISSUE

The Act provides that after a judicial determination that a regulatory order constitutes a "taking" of the land involved in a permit-letting proceeding, the Department of Administration may acquire the fee
or lesser interest in the land by eminent domain and hold it for the
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purposes set forth in the Act.155 This process of compulsory acquisition is limited by three conditions: (1) the Commission must request
that the Department of Administration acquire the land; (2) the Department must find that sufficient funds are available for the acquisition; and (3) the consent of the Governor and the Council of State
must be obtained. 156
It is possible that the purchase of land under this power will be
attacked as unconstitutional on the ground that the condemnation is
not for a public use or purpose. The State is precluded from exercising the power of eminent domain except for such public purposes. 116 In view of the 1972 amendment to the State constitution
known as the "environmental bill of rights" which specifically authorizes land acquisition for environmental purposes, this argument seems
unpersuasive. Moreover it is clear that the United States Constitution will not preclude this type of compulsory acquisition of property
interests.
Article XIV, section 5 of the State constitution, the "environmental
bill of rights," provides as follows:
It shall be the policy of this state to conserve and protect its
lands and waters for the benefit of all its citizenry, and to this end
it shall be a proper function of the State of North Carolina and its
political subdivisions to acquire and preserve park, recreational and
scenic areas, to control and limit the pollution of our air and water, to control excessive noise, and in every other appropriate way
to preserve as a part of the common heritage of this State its forests, wetlands, estuaries, beaches, historical sites, open lands and
places of beauty.' 58
155. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-123(c) (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet
no. 3) does not refer to purposes set forth in any particular section of the Act but rather
to the "purposes set forth in this Article." Presumably the purposes would be those
stated in section 113A-102 which are consistent with the constitutional purposes stated
in article XIV, section 5 of the State constitution.
156. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-123(c) (1974 Advance Legislative Senrice, pamphlet

no. 3).
157. The public use limitation is customarily derived from the "law of the land"
clause of the State constitution. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19. See, e.g., State Highway
Comm'n v. Farm Equip. Co., 281 N.C. 459, 189 S.E.2d 272 (1972); State Highway

Comm'n v. Thornton, 271 N.C. 227, 156 S.E.2d 248 (1967).
158. N.C. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 5. Possibly the second paragraph of this provision
might be read to limit, by implication, the meaning of the word "acquire" in the quoted
paragraph. The second paragraph establishes a procedure for the acquisition of property
"by purchase or gift" and special dedication of that property to constitute part of the
"State Nature and Historic Preserve" by special resolution of the General Assembly. It
is not entirely clear what function this section is intended to accomplish. Perhaps its
purpose is to provide a means of assuring private donors of property that the State, as
donee, will hold the gift for environmental protection purposes. Nonetheless, the first
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There can be little debate that the acquisition of land within a
duly designated area of environmental concern to be held by the State
for the purposes set forth in the Act is specifically authorized by the
language of this provision of the constitution whether -the lands so ac-

quired are considered to be "park, recreation [or] scenic areas" or
whether the eminent domain procedure so authorized is considered to
be an "appropriate way to preserve ..
forests, wetlands, estuaries,
beaches, historical sites, open lands [or] places of beauty." Of
course, -the power of eminent domain is an inherent attribute of sovereignty for which no specific constitutional authorization is required. 159

The importance of the environmental section of the con-

stitution is that it is a clear direction of the people of the State to the
legislature and to the courts that acquisitions of land for preservation
of environmental values are considered to be proper State functions.
It is important here to recognize that the Act does not permit the
State to acquire land for resale to private parties to accomplish some
developmental purpose. The acquisitions permitted under the Act are
solely in aid of the accomplishment of public objectives: no incidental private benefit is possible. 10° The land which is subject to the possibility of eminent domain proceedings under the Act is by definition
land which has been denominated as part of an area of environmental concern.'
The acquisition is possible only after the Commission
phrase of the second paragraph is: "To accomplish the aforementioned public purposes,
the State. . . may acquire by purchase or gift. . . ." In the first paragraph the word
"acquire" is used without limitation. The words "by purchase or gift" used in the second
paragraph might mean that compulsory acquisition is not intended to be a means of accomplishing the objectives stated in the first paragraph. Moreover, the word "purchase" can be read to include eminent domain acquisitions. This is an overly technical
argument to be made in connection with a constitutional text.
159. E.g., Town of Morgantown v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 251 N.C. 531, 112
S.E.2d 111 (1960).
160. Some incidental private benefit or participation will not in itself result in a
characterization that an exercise of eminent domain is not for a public use. See Martin
v. North Carolina Housing Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665 (1970); State Highway
Comm'n v. Thornton, 271 N.C. 227, 156 S.E.2d 248 (1967). However the court recently has indicated that it is mindful of the possibility that the power of eminent domain might be used for a primarily private purpose. See Stanley v. Department of Conservation & Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 35-36, 199 S.E.2d 641, 654-55 (1973); Mitchell v. Industrial Dev. Authority, 273 N.C. 137, 158-59, 159 S.E.2d 745, 760 (1968); Note, Constitutional Law-Public Purpose-RestrictingRevenue Bond Financing of Private Enterprise, 52 N.C.L. Rav. 859 (1974). These problems are not raised by the Act. The
Act permits only a simple taking in the name of the State without potential for even
incidental benefit to private persons.
161. Section 113A-120(c) applies only when a finding has been made under section
113A-123(b) that a final decision or order of the Commission is an invalid exercise of
the police power. The final orders reviewable under section 113A-123(b) are only those
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has determined that the objectives of the Act require that development
permission be denied and it has been judicially determined -thatthe objectives of the Act cannot be accomplished through regulation without
compensation. The procedure is hedged with safeguards established
by the General Assembly, and the State constitution specifically declares this form of land acquisition to be an appropriate governmental function. There is no apparent reason for the State courts to conclude that the acquisitions of land pursuant to the procedures established by the Act are not for a "public use."
The United States Constitution also allows this type of compulsory acquisition of property. Berman v. Parker'12 sanctions exercises
of the eminent domain power under the federal constitution for
broadly defined public purposes. There, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a unanimous Court, likened the scope of the eminent domain
power to the scope of the police power and concluded that the compulsory acquisition of a fee interest in non-blighted property within a
District of Columbia
redevelopment project area was for a permissible
"public use.' 6 3 Justice Douglas' opinion reflects great judicial deference to legislative judgments that the quality of the human environment requires that the government intervene in the marketplace by acquiring land and redeveloping it:
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive. . . . Ihe concept of the public welfare is
broad and inclusive. . . . [Ihe values it represents are spiritual
as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It -is within the
power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious
as well as clean, well-bal64
anced as well as carefully patrolled.
Berman v. Parker's expansive view of the public use limitation of
the fifth amendment indicates that the federal courts are likely to find
that the "public use' question will be governed by the General Assembly's determination to permit acquisitions of land within areas of
environmental concern to be held for the purposes set forth in the Act.
under part 4 of the Act, the permit-letting procedure which applies only to development
projects "in any area of environmental concern . . . ." N.C. Gm. STAT. § 113A118(a) (1974 Advance Legislative Service, pamphlet no. 3).
162. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
163. Id. at 32.
164. Id. at 32-33.
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Thus the Act's provision for exercise of the eminent domain power by
the Department of Administration under the circumstances set forth in
the Act is unlikely to be held violative of either the State or federal constitution.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Coastal Area Management Act is a most significant bit of legislation. While it is unclear that the Act will be implemented to effectively put an end to ad hoc and harmful spoilation of our coastal resources, it is nonetheless a hopeful beginning point for a new era of
land and water use regulation which involves explicit sensitivity to
ecological as well as economic factors and which involves State government in a regulatory partnership with the county and city governments. The constitutionality of this important legislation certainly will
be tested, and it is to be hoped the questions involved will be litigated effectively.
Although I am personally sympathetic with the purposes of the
Act, I began my inquiries into the issues described in this essay with
considerable skepticism. In particular I feared that the Act would be
held invalid as "local legislation" and that it would be vulnerable to
a non-delegation doctrine attack. My mind has been changed on
these matters, in large part because I have become greatly impressed
with the Act as a sensitively drawn political compromise, which treats
a difficult subject matter with care and attention. Holdings that this
is invalid "local legislation" or that certain power delegations to the
Commission are constitutionally impermissible are not, in my view, required by North Carolina precedent. More importantly, however,
such decisions might substantially limit the ability of the General Assembly to deal with other complex subjects relevant to sections of a
large and diverse state.
While the "takings" clause of the Act is certainly not unconstitutional, its interpretation and application are yet to be tested. The ultimate effectiveness of the Act probably will depend upon judicial interpretations of the "practical uses" test. Environmentalists must hope
for vigorous and thoughtful advocacy which will persuade 'the courts
to use the "practical uses" test as an invitation to engage in a sensitive process of balancing private harm against public benefit with a
full appreciation of the importance of the fragile coastal ecosystem to
the quality of life of all North Carolinians.
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If these constitutional questions are answered favorably to the
Act-as I believe they should-North Carolinians can hope that we
have a chance to preserve the unique features of our coast without unnecessary and undesirable interference with useful economic development.

